The Legitimate Rights of Southern Cameroons Independence, (The Republic of Ambazonia).

By CASIMIR ETOE NGOME,

SCNC UK

Above is the official map of Southern Cameroons and the official flag of Ambazonia (former British Southern Cameroons which today is illegally recognised as the North West and South West regions of La Republique du Cameroun).

Achieving goals and dreams usually requires some level of sacrifice. It might mean putting everything in life on the hold in favour of working towards your dreams, investing all of your savings, or giving up a few hours of sleep each night. Many people proclaim they want to achieve their goals, yet are unwilling to pay the price it takes to make their dreams a reality.

However, before you can ever choose to pay the price, you must know what the price is. If you don’t know what will truly be required to make your dreams a reality, investigate what it will take to achieve your desired goals. Research the causes of your discontent, the cost you might be required to pay and the costs other people have had to pay to achieve dreams similar to yours.

But if the price is something you are willing to pay, commit yourself to achieving your dream, no matter what it takes. The willingness therefore to do whatever is required is the magic ingredient that helps you persevere in the face of the challenges, setbacks, pain, and even personal injury.

Total independence for Southern Cameroons is my ultimate dream, if your dream is alike, then we have to fight for it till the end, in fact till the last man standing.

The way to independence for Southern Cameroons, is in the hands of the United Nations, Britain, and the people of Southern Cameroonians themselves. The UN should pursue the same path it took to grant independence to other UN trust territories. It must be highlighted here that Southern Cameroons is a unique UN trust territory that was and is still annexed by La Republique du Cameroun and France through an orthodox means by granting it independence with union within La Republique du Cameroun in 1961.

The UN should implement the UNGA Resolution 1514 – (XIV) of 14 December 1960 on the granting of independence to colonial territories and peoples, in which Southern Cameroons is a colonial territory within the UN.

History is one thing that must be referred to in order to avoid a repeat of a costly mistake in the future. It is in the light of the above that La Republique du Cameroun government failed to correct these mistakes more than 5 decades ago by totally assimilating, subjugating and annexation of Southern Cameroons.

To therefore correct these mistakes committed by La Republique du Cameroun, in 2016, lawyers went on a strike in an effort to force the government to stop appointing francophone magistrates who have no mastery of the English language and had no training in English Common Law to preside over courts in Southern Cameroons. Thus, during peaceful demonstrations in the cities of Buea and Bamenda, the lawyers were roughly manhandled by government forces.

Teachers too on their part, came out in support of the lawyers. They wanted the government to stop posting and transferring francophone teachers who have no mastery of the English language to teach subjects other than French in Anglophone schools. The government responded by banning the trade unions, many members-some of whom were engaged in negotiations with the government were arrested, and jailed on charges of terrorism and attempts to change the form of state.

As people across other professions sympathise with the teachers and lawyers, who instituted ‘ghosts towns’ in Southern Cameroon cities, everywhere on certain days of the week as part of a large scale boycott, the government again responded by shutting down the internet for 91 days.

As a result, the Southern Cameroonians took the matter in their own hands, and became more determined than ever before for a restoration of the independence of their statehood (Ambazonia).

Southern Cameroons must therefore be strong, resilient, focused, united and remember that there is no freedom served to any one person or people on a plate of gold. We will fight till one man remain standing, noting that there is no turning back. We will stop at nothing until we get what rightly belongs to us and our generations to come which is INDEPENDENCE.

By

Mathew N. M. Ngime

SCNC UK

Introduction

The premeditated marriage between the British Southern Cameroons and La Republique du Cameroun has become what could finally be termed a “barren tree” that has not only refused to bear fruits but hunting down its proponents. Fifty years of epic failures of the reunification have vanished, but the saga of the union that was orchestrated by La Republique du Cameroun continues in a rather appalling transformational cinema(Awasom, 2000). After decades of failed attempts to subvert the ideologies of anglophonism, and to francophonise the British Southern Cameroonians through what could be termed an “internal annexation agenda”, it has come of age for the central government to look at itself in the “federation mirror” and “mind the gap” that exists between the two territories in all ramifications(Nzume, 2004).In light of “minding the gap”, the Southern Cameroon National Council (SCNC) set the pace in 1995 for self-determination towards a peacefully negotiated independence, upon realizing that the union was a historical mistake that culminated ina wedding song dedicated to a couple in the mirror. The liberation of the British Southern Cameroons from outright marginalisation and torture(Yundze, 2017)cannot be syphoned off in favour of what can be considered first-class “cultural erosion”.This cultural erosion looms particularly with the recent passing of the bilingualism bill. It is today logical to settle on the fact that among the different schools of thought regarding the future of the British Southern Cameroons that emerged, credit is to be given to P.M. Kale of the KUP, Chief Nyenti of CCC,Fon V.S. Galega II,and F. N. Ajebe Sone of the KNC, and the “voice of the traditional rulers”,FonAchiribi II, who advocated for complete secession and independent state(Akara, 2015).

Since 2016, the “Etudi Palace” has been met with increasing ferocious commotion from the two English-speaking regions in Cameroon: the British Southern Cameroons, who believe secession is the only solution to be freed from the wanton political experience. This follows brutality, torture, intimidation, imprisonment, and indiscriminate killingdeployed by the central government as the only vectors to stop the civil insurrection and restore peace. The pandemonium which escalated in late 2016 when Anglophone lawyers took the streets and subsequently by teachers and students has led to many being victimised, abused, tortured, internally displaced, and killed. More than 3,000 have been killed with over 500,000 internally displaced and over 50,000 as refugees(Hendricks and Kiven, 2019; Fearnley and Silverman, 2020). The Anglophone problem can be attributed to 4 main causes including (1) shared colonialism, (2) constitutional problems, (3) internal annexation agenda, and (4) self-proclamation of independence.

Shared Colonialism: The missing Condominium

Cameroon is a bilingual country as a result of its dual colonisation by Britain and France. Cameroon’s tri-colonial period can be divided into the German protectorate (1884 – 1919),Mandate (1922 – 1945), and the Trusteeship (1945 – 1961) periods. The unequal partitioning of the territory, which subsequently became subject to foreign rule could be considered as the genesis of what is today known as the Anglophone problem(Konings and Nyamnjoh, 1997; Piet Konings and Nyamnjoh, 2003; Njung, 2019; Awasom, 2020; Agwanda and Asal, 2021). Cameroon was annexed in 1884 and remained under German rule until they were defeated in Europe during the First World War (WW1) in 1914 and subsequently in Cameroon by the British and French on March 17, 1916. The defeat in Cameroon led to an unequivocal partitioning of Kamerun (as it was called during the German rule) on June 28, 1919, following the Treaty of Versailles led by the “Big Four” (United States, Britain, France, and Italy)(Foreign Relations of the United States, no date; Neilson, 1999; History.com Editors, 2009; United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2016),with France taking about 80% of the territory. This sowed the seed for future discontent. This partitioning was formalised by the League of Nations (created during the Versailles Treaty) on July 20, 1922, when Cameroon became a mandated territory and later as a UN trust territory in 1945, administered as separate territories by Britain and France(Mbuh, no date). British Southern Cameroons was administered from the Eastern Region of Enugu State in Nigeria. By October 1, 1954, British Southern Cameroonshad started a government and became a fully self-administered region by 1959. On January 1, 1960, French Cameroon baptised as “La Republique du Cameroun” (as distinct from the present-day Republic of Cameroon)became independent, followed by Nigeria on October 1, 1960 (Federal Republic of Nigeria), leaving British Cameroons at crossroads. Through a UN organised Plebiscite on February 11, 1961, the Northern and Southern British Cameroons were given only 2 options to get independence, to vote either to join (1) the Federal Republic of Nigeria or (2) La Republique du Cameroun(Fearnley and Silverman, 2020; Agwanda and Asal, 2021).

The fact that Britain lobbied for British Cameroons to join Nigeria did not only hamper the achievement of their independence but for British Southern Cameroons to be given fair treatment during the federation. This will later be seen in their neutrality and boycott of the Fouban constitutional talks. While British Northern Cameroons voted to join Nigeria, British Southern Cameroons on a “no-third-choice” basis voted (70%) to join La Republique du Cameroun, to become the Federal Republic of Cameroon. Following this, the UN passed a resolution (Resolution 1608)(UN, no date), outlining how the transition from the trusteeship was to be ensured before October 1, 1961. The lack of a condominium during this decolonisation process will later play negatively on the English-speaking minority and pave the way for the loss of the much desired sovereignty as a result of constitutional conspiracy. There is evidence that time was not taken to explain the implications of the different choices to the British Southern Cameroons who ignorantly cast their votes(Hansard, 1961).

Constitutional Conspiracy Dynamics

The British Southern Cameroons led by John NguFoncha and the Republic of Cameroon led by President AhmadouAhidjo met at the Foumban conference for a draft constitution on how the federation was to be run. The constitution which was to ensure federalism instead ensured a process from external annexation to internal annexation(Anyangwe, 2019). Articles 15 and 47 of the constitution gave excessive powers to the president including revising the constitution(Ebolo, 2014).It is also important to note here that the Foumban conference only came to compound the mistake that was already done by the KNDP and Kamerun Society (KS) that advocated for reunification with French Cameroon and rejected the option of an independent state during the London Constitutional Conference (LCC) of 1957(Akara, 2015). This was a perfect opportunity to correct the historical mistake. The Mamfe Plebiscite Conference of August 1959 that ended in a fiasco could not correct the mistake either. The price of failure to address the concerns of the British Southern Cameroons during these two conferences later manifested in the restriction of the UN Plebiscite options to just two. The omission of the third option of an independent British Southern Cameroon was also seen as a good argument for security against possible terrorist attacks from the maquisards of the then banned UPC in French Cameroon led by Roland Moumie, Abel Kingue and Ernest Oaundie(Nfi, 2011), as well as a good manoeuvre to win over the British Southern Cameroons in voting to join the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

Eleven years (May 20, 1972), after the constitution was reluctantly signed by Premier Foncha, President AhmadouAhidjo changed the constitution through a referendum, moving the country from the Federal Republic of Cameroon to the United Republic of Cameroon. It is believed that this came briefly after the discovery of oil in British Southern Cameroon’s Victoria(Tembon, 2016) now known as Limbe. Twelve years later (February 4, 1984), President Paul Biya (who took power in 1982)passed a decree changing the name from the United Republic of Cameroon to the Republic of Cameroon with the implication that the double-star flag that represented the federation now became a single star flag. Added to that, the position of vice president was abolished and that of the prime minister was created. What this meant was that the position of Anglophones in Cameroon now shifted from the 2^nd to the 5^th personality, starting with the President, Senate president, speaker of the National Assembly, chairman of the Economic and Social Council, and the Prime Minister. The intention to completely assimilate and overwrite the identity of the British Southern Cameroons then became evident.

The change of the political landscape into multipartism launched in 1990 gave birth to a series of mechanisms, organisations, and channels through which the British Southern Cameroons could express their grievances. The Southern Cameroon National Council (SCNC) created in 1995 and led by Justice Frederick AlobwedeEbongwith the assistance of NforNgalaNfor, assumed the role of the executive council of all Anglophone movements(Piet. Konings and Nyamnjoh, 2003). The SCNC aims at a gradual nonviolent negotiation towards independence of a Federal Republic of Southern Cameroons (FRSC) underpinned by its motto, “the force of argument and not the argument of force”. The SCNC was banned in 2001(Agwanda and Asal, 2021) in an attempt to hide the truth from the public, part of the reason for which the true version of Cameroon history was never taught in schools. This led to the creation of the Anglophone Civil Society Consortium, whose banning also led to the creation of the Southern Cameroon Ambazonia Consortium United Front (SCACUF)(Depart of Foreign Affairs, 2018).

Internal Annexation Agenda

The internal annexation agenda was enshrined in the central government’s plan to constantly change the constitution till the deal is done. The wiping of anglophonism from the public space in Cameroon looms as tensions continue to build up with the recent passing of the bilingualism bill. The central government will not stop at anything in completing the internal annexation process of the British Southern Cameroons that was simply formalized during the Foumban conference(Achankeng, 2015). It is alleged that top officials of La Republic who attended the “primary school conference” in Fouban referred to as the “sham conference” elsewhere(Konings and Nyamnjoh, 2019) already knew that the Foumban Conference was the formal start of the annexation agenda of the British Southern Cameroons(Anyangwe, 2009). It is reported that before the Foumban Conference, the UN organised Plebicite was characterised by manic political propaganda and deceit to deter Southern Cameroonians from the popular opinion of an independent entity.This was further compounded by Foncha’s growing interest in reunification(Kam Kah, 2016) following a series of meetings with President AmadouAhidjo. It is also worth noting that the referendum was organised in french Cameroon and it is therefore not surprising that the president received an overwhelming landslide vote in favour of a unitary state.The current president who was the Prime Minister under President Ahidjo, prior to his rise to power following Law No.79/2 of 29 June 1979, must have had a grasp of the annexation agenda and as such simply expedited it.  Like to say that the plan put forth by President Ahidjo was too slow, President Paul Biyawill not call for a referendum but simply pass a decree for the country’s change of name. In summary, the UN Plebiscite “sowed” the seed of internal annexation, President AhmadouAhidjo “watered”, and President Paul Biya “sealed” the deal

The persistence of the Anglophone movements organized under the SCNC amid all odds including the Southern Cameroon Youth League (SCYL), Cameroon Anglophone Movement that became the Southern Cameroon Restoration Movement (SCARM), Sothern Cameroon People’s Organisation (SCPO), Ambazonia Movement, Coalition for Dialogue and Negotiation (CDN), among others, has largely been due to the neglect and complete refusal by the central government to give ear to the plight of the Anglophones or even acknowledge that there is anything as the “Anglophone problem”(Nkongho and Shepherd, 2017). This is particularly so because giving ear to the Anglophones will be contrary to the original plan to completely erode the identity of British Southern Cameroons(Fonchingong, 2013). This is no news as it must be noted here that the annexationof the central government dates as far back as the French colonial period. While Britain’s policy was based on “divide and rule”,evident in the partitioning of its territory into Northern and Southern British Cameroons, it should not be forgotten that France implemented the policy of “assimilation” in all its colonies whereby locals are subjected to a complete cultural transformation and change of identity. It would have therefore been foolish to think that la Republic du Cameroun will respect the terms of the federation had it been this was still the case, that is to say, the least.  Going by this, it will be wise to believe that federalism will not even be on the agenda of a national dialogue, that is if there ever happens to be one, in the absence of the international community. Accusing fingers have been pointed at the UN, Britain, and Nigeria for conspiracy over expediting the annexation of the British Southern Cameroons by “La Republic du Cameroun”(Edward, 2018; Konings and Nyamnjoh, 2019). This is evident in the continued decline of British interest in the British Southern Cameroons with the advent of reunification(Willis et al., 2020).

The military indiscriminately kills civilians under the pretext of searching for “freedom fighters”, with the ultimate aim to completely wipe out the notion of Anglophonism from the public space. The Ngabuh village incident of February 14, 2020(Craig, 2020), the Muambong raid of April 22 in the same year(CNA, 2020)alongside many other documented cases(Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, 2021; HRW, 2022) are a clear testimony. The central government has further tightened its grip on the British Southern Cameroons through the passing of the bilingualism bill. This did not just sound like a real blow in the teeth after all the wrangling over marginalisation but like the last straw as well. The onus is upon the SCNC to engage the international community in bringing efforts up-to-speed in stopping the brutality, torture, calumny, imprisonment, and killings that have become the main vectors of pushing forward the annexation agenda.

Self-proclamation of Independence

In order to get an understanding of the foundations of separatism and self-proclamation of independence, it is worth shedding lighton the past. Separatism is not a word that emerged out of the cloud in the historiography of Cameroon.The idea of separatism and independence which was indigenous to the British Southern Cameroons started with the Mamfe Conference of June 1948 that culminated in the unanimous approval and petition for a separate entity(Budi, 2019). This desire was formalised through the merging of Endeley’sKamerun National Federation (KNF) and Dibongue’sKamerun United National Congress (KUNC), to form the Kamerun National Congress (KNC) in 1953. This was led by 3 activists including Solomon TandengMuna, Emanuel MbelaLifafeEndeley, and John NguFoncha. The KNC had as sole aim to fight for the independence of the British Southern Cameroons. This is what led to the creation of a legislative house: House of Assembly in Buea by Britain (Council of Order of 1954) with an executive council and Dr Emanuel MbelaLifafeEndeley as the leader, giving the British Southern Cameroons partial autonomy from the Nigerian Federation. In 1955, John NguFoncha and Solomon TendengMuna left the KNC to form the Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP), following the change of the political opinion of Dr. E.M.L Endeley who instead advocated for integration with Nigeria. Among those who advocated for secession from Nigeria and independent state were P.M. Kale of the KUP, Chief Nyenti of CCC, Fon V.S. Galega II and F. N. Ajebe Sone of the KNC, and the “voice of the traditional rulers” FonAchiribi II(Akara, 2015).

The UN resolution 1064 of 26 February 1957(UN General Assembly, no date a; UN GA (11th Session:1956-1957), 1957) and 1207 of December 13, 1957(UN General Assembly, no date b) requested for the fast-tracking of procedures for all trust territories to attain independence. This in addition to mounting pressures gave British Southern Cameroons autonomy and the status of a fully self-managed region. Dr. E. M. L. Endeley emerged as the first Prime Minister after free and fair elections between KNC and KNDP. It was the need for independence from Nigeria that led to the replacement of Dr. E. M. L. Endeley with John NguFonchawhose ideologies were more acceptable to the people. This was a clear indication that the people choose the leader they want and not the leader choosing the people he/she wants to secure his position in power.

Prior to the escalation of the Anglophone problem, it must be recalled that the British Southern Cameroons issued a number of warnings upon realising that the federation was not fit for purpose and that it was merely an agenda to annexation and assimilation. It is equally pertinent to logically think that the emergence of SCNC was as a result of the inability of the central government to heed to the concerns raised during the All Anglophones Conference of Buea in 1993 and subsequently in Bamenda in 1994, which culminated into the “Buea Declaration”(Ngoh, 1999) and the “Bamenda Declaration” respectively, with the latter serving a warning to the government to restore the federation without which there will be a self-proclamation of independence. On December 31, 1999, members of the SCNC took over the Buea Radio Station and proclaimed independence read by Judge Frederick AlobwedeEbong. On October 11, 2016, Anglophone lawyers took the streets to raise concerns about the common law which is constantly being undermined and gradually being replaced with civil law. This was particularly concerning because under the common law, one is innocent until proven guilty, whereas, under civil law, the same is guilty until he/she proves contrary. The government response was brutal, with many arrested and imprisoned. This was followed by teachers on November 21, 2016, complaining of French teachers constantly being deployed to teach in Anglophone schools. The response was the same and perhaps worse. University students followed suit but the response was characterised by torture, rape, and arrests. This indicated that the government was not ready to condone anything having to do with Anglophone nationalism.

On October 1, 2017, Anglophone movements championed by the SCACUF self-proclaimed independence in the Southern Cameroon territory, into a new state known as the Federal Republic of Ambazionia(Depart of Foreign Affairs, 2018). This escalated into armed conflicts between civilians and the military, leading to many being killed (more than 3,000), internally displaced (more than 500,000), with the greater majority (about 50,000) fleeing into Nigeria as refugees(Hendricks and Kiven, 2019). In an attempt to see into the plight of the many internally displaced and seeking humanitarian assistance, the leaders of the SCACUF including the president, SisikuAyukTabe, and other elites met at the Nera Hotel in Abuja in Nigeria. They were arrested on January 5, 2018, by the Nigerian Department of State Security, extradited to Cameroon on January 23, 2018, and handed to the Cameroon government. Since then, there have been serial unrest in the two English speaking regions leading to innocent killings and unspeakable violation of human rights(Willis et al., 2019; Cameroon 2020, 2020; US Department of State, 2021).

SCNC and the Anglophone Nationalism

Evidence suggests that the reason for the failed independence of British Southern Cameroons in the past was because the slogan of reunification was given more attention over the need for independence(Njeuma, 1995). Besides, it could be argued that while British Southern Cameroons perceived reunification as the unconditional means to obtain independence, but with culturally distinct identities and equivocal powers, La Republique du Cameroun saw it as an opportunity for assimilation avant-garde(Konings and Nyamnjoh, 2021) and equated it to a surrender of sovereignty(Agwanda and Asal, 2021). It is alleged that President Charles de Gaulle’s perception of British Southern Cameroons was that of the Queen’s gift to France(Milen, 1999), and this is the treatment that the region has received since then. Notwithstanding the calumny regarding the SCNC’s efforts to end the struggle, it is incumbent on the SCNC to bring together its sister organizations and engage the international community if the struggle must forge ahead.The SCNC has made several attempts in raising awareness about the plight of the Anglophones. Apart from indiscriminate killings and human rights abuses most diffused through social media, it is thanks to the SCNC’s continued human right abiding approach that the problem has received international recognition.Aligning this with history, it must be noted that peaceful negotiations have always received international recognition as the gold standard. That is why the Union des Populations Camerounaises (UPC) fought for the separate independence of both Cameroons(Ngoh, 1979) but it was granted to Union Camerounaise (UC) that went for peaceful negotiation(Jone, 1998) with France. Some remarkable efforts of the SCNC include the nine-man delegation to the UN on May 19, 1995,a mission statement to the UN,  numerous petitions against the annexation of British Southern Cameroons, the two-man delegation to the Commonwealth summit in Auckland in November 1995 to note that Cameroon did not meet the criteriafor admission into Commonwealth, the formation of the Southern Cameroons Peoples Organisation (SCAPO) and its role in the ruling of the Nigerian Federal High Court restraining the Nigerian government from treating the people of British Southern Cameroons as an integral part of La Republique du Cameroun, a complaint against La Republiquedu Cameroon to the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR)(Konings and Nyamnjoh, 2019), its membership with the Unrepresented Nations and People’s Organisation (UNPO)(The Star, 2011), and the organisation of public demos, just to name a few.

The SCNC as the flag bearer(Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, no date; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2018)that considers that today’s British Southern Cameroons are victims of imperfect decolonization and internal annexation by La Republique du Cameroun(About Scnc – Southern Cameroon National Council UK, no date; SCNC, 2006)has a pivotal role in the realisation of the dreams of the British Southern Cameroonians. The banning of the SCNC in 2001 in an attempt to subdue the ranks of its influence(IRIN, 2007), ravaged and shifted its momentum to the diaspora with the most active arms in the UK and the US.There is the need for a renewed sense of hope and purpose among the British Southern Cameroonians to assume a continuum.Albeit having the ultimate task of bringing together all the pressure groups and promoting a strong sense of unity and patriotism, it must observe that this is done with care as there are reports of fake movements within the movement itself setup by the government.  For instance, it is reported that there is a government-created SCNC with the sole aim of downplaying the credibility of the SCNC(Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC), no date).The SCNC should recognise rebuilding the unity which is gradually fading away(Konings and Nyamnjoh, 2019) and risks putting international commitment to the course at crossroads, as being primordial.

At crossroads and pressing is the question of humanitarian support for those who have been imprisoned incommunicado, internally displaced, and in refugee camps. There is an urgent need to explore funding avenues to support the many reported to be affected(Department for International Development and Baldwin, 2018; Norwegian Refugee Council, 2021) by the conflict. UNICEF UK estimates that USD20 million are needed by UNICEF to meet its commitment in supporting children in difficulties in the British Southern Cameroons(Unicef UK Media Team, 2019). In response to this call, the SCNC may either append its efforts to those of UNICEF UK or act as a case-finding facilitator. A secondary data review has assessed the risks and needs of those affected by the crisis(Global Protection Cluster, 2019).

Conclusion

The need and struggle for independence of the British Southern Cameroons has left many British Southern Cameronians in limbo and it is not clear when this perplexing and sickening situation will come to an end. The account in this commentary indicates that West Cameroon was politically maneuvered and brainwashed by the so-called “Fouban Federal Constitution” which meant different things to both parties(Agwanda and Asal, 2021). While the federation was seen by West Cameroon as an escape corridor from Nigeria(Ngoh, 1979)but also as a safety net to maintaining cultural, political, economic, and educational integrity(Achankeng, 2015), to the East “wing”, it was the start of the annexation process of the English counterparts as British Southern Cameroons was simply invited to adopt a draft constitution. As such, the terms of the constitution of a federal republic were unilaterally decided. This can be evident in the central government’s crackdown of any opposition directed to this end. It is logical to think that the banning of the SCNC that believes in the peaceful resolution of the Anglophone problem led to the proliferation of more violent pressure groups. This has led to divided attention among the British Southern Cameroonians: a major bone of contention to deal with. Leaders of the different pressure groups need to get their heads straight.

The Anglophone problem despite being complex is one that can,further to a failed federal system, be attributed to the central government’s continued effort to annex and assimilate English speaking Cameroon and completely eradicate the ideology of anglophonism. It is customary to think that a complete eradication and replacement of the ideology of anglophonism should be the final bus stop of the central government and it will not hesitate to use radical measures in the process(Holmdahl and Buckee, 2020). It cannot, therefore, be surprising that the central government declared war against British Southern Cameroonians instead of sustainably seeking to address the issues that were raised. It is also not surprising why the decentralization promised a long time ago is hard to come by, neither should it be surprising why the Swiss process and the Yaoundé talks of September 30, 2019, framed as “national dialogue”came to nothing. The ubiquitous nature of French officials in the British Southern Cameroon institutions is simply a revelation of this annexation agenda. It can be said that the Anglophone problem sumsto the resilience to assimilation and the internal annexation agenda of the central government. Any peace talks that will fall short of the involvement of the United Nations will simply be a repetition of the same mistakes of the Foumban Conference. It is imperative, for British Southern Camerooniansto put aside their differences, for fear that the question of who is who? in the struggle becomes even more important than the negotiation process itself(Bone, 2020). It is also important to think that the internal conflicts among the British Southern Cameroonians themselves demonstrate a lack of maturity(Bone, 2021) and may tend to give reason to the international community to believe that they did not make a mistake in limiting the UN Plebiscite question options to two. Besides, within the political landscape of Cameroon itself, addressing the Anglophone problem may not be a priority to the central government that is preoccupied with wrangling over who becomes the next president(Jeune Afrique, 2020).

(Commonwealth Day SCNC protest of March 9, 2020 at Wesminster Abbey, London)

Mathew N. M. Ngime

References

About Scnc – Southern Cameroon National Council UK (no date) SCNC UK. Available at: http://scnc-uk.com/about-scnc/ (Accessed: 15 March 2022).

Achankeng, F. (2015) ‘The Foumban” Constitutional” Talks and Prior Intentions of Negotiating: A Historico-Theoretical Analysis of a False Negotiation and the Ramifications for Political Developments in Cameroon’, Journal of Global Initiatives: Policy, Pedagogy, Perspective, 9(2), p. 11. Available at: https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1178&context=jgi (Accessed: 25 October 2021).

Agwanda, B. and Asal, U. Y. (2021) The Anglophone problem in Cameroon: The change from crisis to conflict, and a possible way forward to resolution, ACCORD. Available at: https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/the-anglophone-problem-in-cameroon-the-change-from-crisis-to-conflict-and-a-possible-way-forward-to-resolution/ (Accessed: 25 October 2021).

Akara, D. T. (2015) ‘The Kamerun society: A missing link in the independence struggle in the British Southern Cameroons, 195661’, African Journal of History and Culture. Academic Journals, 7(4), pp. 91–99. doi: 10.5897/ajhc2014.0238.

Anyangwe, C. (2009) Betrayal of too trusting a people: The UN, the UK and the trust territory of the Southern Cameroons, Betrayal of Too Trusting a People: The UN, the UK and the Trust Territory of the Southern Cameroons. Available at: https://muse.jhu.edu/book/16790 (Accessed: 14 March 2022).

Anyangwe, C. (2019) UN Res. 1608 (XV): Problem or Answer to Southern Cameroons Independence?, AmbaNews24. Available at: https://ambanews24.com/analysis-opinion-on-unga-res-1608-xv-of-21-april-1961/ (Accessed: 25 October 2021).

Awasom, N. F. (2000) ‘The reunification question in Cameroon history: Was the bride an enthusiastic or a reluctant one?’, Africa Today, pp. 90–119. doi: 10.2979/AFT.2000.47.2.90.

Awasom, N. F. (2020) ‘The anglophone problem in Cameroon yesterday and today in search of a definition’, Journal of the African Literature Association. Routledge, 14(2), pp. 264–291. doi: 10.1080/21674736.2020.1717124.

Bone, R. M. (2020) Ahead of peace talks, a who’s who of Cameroon’s separatist movements, The New Humanitarian. Available at: https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2020/07/08/Cameroon-Ambazonia-conflict-peace-whos-who (Accessed: 17 February 2022).

Bone, R. M. (2021) Cameroon’s elusive peace: Rivals, rifts, and secret talks, The New Humanitarian. Available at: https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2021/3/29/cameroons-elusive-peace-rivals-rifts-and-secret-talks (Accessed: 17 February 2022).

Budi, R. N. (2019) ‘Colonial Administrative Integration of African Territories: Identity and Resistance in Nigeria’s Southern Cameroons, 1922–1961’, IAFOR Journal of Arts & Humanities. The International Academic Forum (IAFOR), 6(1), pp. 109–122. doi: 10.22492/ijah.6.1.09.

Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights,  and L. (2021) 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Cameroon, US Department of State. Available at: https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/CAMEROON-2020-HUMAN-RIGHTS-REPORT.pdf (Accessed: 8 February 2022).

Cameroon 2020 (2020) Amnesty International Amnesty International. Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/africa/west-and-central-africa/cameroon/report-cameroon/ (Accessed: 25 October 2021).

Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (no date) Cameroon: The Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC) and the Southern Cameroons Youth League (SCYL); organizational structures; leaders; activities; membership cards; treatment of their members by government authorities (2010-February 2014), 11 March , Refworld. Available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/5373373d6.html (Accessed: 15 March 2022).

CNA (2020) Report: CHRDA Blames Government Forces For Killing Civilians In Muambong, Cameroon News Agency. Available at: https://cameroonnewsagency.com/report-chrda-blames-government-forces-for-killing-civilians-in-muambong/ (Accessed: 8 February 2022).

Craig, J. (2020) How an ‘execution-style’ massacre unfolded in Cameroon, The New Humanitarian. Available at: https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2020/03/03/Cameroon-Ambazonia-Ngarbuh-massacre (Accessed: 8 February 2022).

Depart of Foreign Affairs (2018) Ambazonia: Journey to Independence and Ongoing Genocide by Cameroon Government. Available at: https://www.ambazoniagov.org/images/docs/AMBAZONIA-JOURNEY-TO-INDEPENDENCE-AND-ONGOINGGENOCIDE-BY-CAMEROON-GOVERNMENT.pdf (Accessed: 25 October 2021).

Department for International Development and Baldwin, H. (2018) Press release: UK aid for children caught up in Cameroon conflict, GOV.UK. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-aid-for-children-caught-up-in-cameroon-conflict (Accessed: 15 March 2022).

Ebolo, E. E. (2014) ‘Sovereignty in the Making : The Case of Anglophone Cameroon’, ResearchGate, (December 2012), pp. 0–27. Available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/269575409_Sovereignty_in_the_Making_The_Case_of_Anglophone_Cameroon (Accessed: 25 October 2021).

Edward, H. (2018) ‘The Force of Argumentt and the Fight for an Anglophone Identity in Cameroon’, SSRN Electronic Journal. doi: 10.2139/ssrn.2529021.

Fearnley, J. and Silverman, A. (2020) The Global Campaign for Peace and Justice in Cameroon-Written evidence (ZAF0028). Available at: https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/768/pdf/ (Accessed: 25 October 2021).

Fonchingong, T. (2013) ‘The quest for autonomy: The case of Anglophone Cameroon’, African Journal of Political Science and International Relations, 7(5), pp. 224–236. doi: 10.5897/ajpsir10.033.

Foreign Relations of the United States (no date) Milestones: 1914–1920: The Paris Peace Conference and the Treaty of Versailles, Office of the Historian. Available at: https://history.state.gov/milestones/1914-1920/paris-peace (Accessed: 6 February 2022).

Global Protection Cluster (2019) Risks and Needs for Child Protection in Cameroon-North West and South West Crisis, Reliefweb.int. Available at: https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/swnw_cameroon_sdr_2019_final_.pdf (Accessed: 15 March 2022).

Hansard, T. C. (1961) Commons Sitting of 20 February 1961: The Cameroons (vol 635), UK Parliament. Available at: https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1961/feb/20/the-cameroons (Accessed: 19 March 2022).

Hendricks, C. and Kiven, G. N. (2019) Why Cameroon must move beyond dialogue to solve its Anglophone crisis, The Conversation. Available at: https://theconversation.com/why-cameroon-must-move-beyond-dialogue-to-solve-its-anglophone-crisis-125241 (Accessed: 25 October 2021).

History.com Editors (2009) Treaty of Versailles – Definition, Terms & WWI – HISTORY, A&E Television Networks. Available at: https://www.history.com/topics/world-war-i/treaty-of-versailles-1 (Accessed: 6 February 2022).

Holmdahl, I. and Buckee, C. (2020) ‘Wrong but Useful — What Covid-19 Epidemiologic Models Can and Cannot Tell Us’, New England Journal of Medicine. Massachusetts Medical Society, 383(4), pp. 303–305. doi: 10.1056/nejmp2016822.

HRW (2022) Cameroon: Soldiers on Rampage in North-West Region, Human Rights Watch. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/02/03/cameroon-soldiers-rampage-north-west-region (Accessed: 8 February 2022).

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (2018) Responses to Information Requests: The Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC), IRB, Canada. Available at: https://irb.gc.ca/en/country-information/rir/Pages/index.aspx?doc=457518 (Accessed: 15 March 2022).

IRIN (2007) Secessionist minority Anglophone group silenced, The New Humanitarian. Available at: https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2007/02/19/secessionist-minority-anglophone-group-silenced (Accessed: 14 March 2022).

Jeune Afrique (2020) Cameroon’s Anglophone crisis: Rivalries hamper peace talks, The African Report. Available at: https://www.theafricareport.com/37187/cameroons-anglophone-crisis-rivalries-hamper-peace-talks/ (Accessed: 17 February 2022).

Jone, J. (1998) African History Timeline: Independent Cameroon, Web.archive.org. Available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20090508145621/http://courses.wcupa.edu/jones/his311/timeline/t-camer.htm (Accessed: 16 March 2022).

Kam Kah, H. (2016) ‘Impact of Independence of the Republic of Cameroun on the Future Independence and Reunification of British Southern Cameroons’, Social Science Review, 2(2). Available at: http://ssr-net.com/issues/Vol_2_No_2_December_2016/1.pdf (Accessed: 14 March 2022).

Konings, P. and Nyamnjoh, F. B. (1997) ‘The anglophone problem in Cameroon’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 35(2), pp. 207–229. doi: 10.1017/S0022278X97002401.

Konings, Piet. and Nyamnjoh, F. B. (2003) Negotiating an Anglophone identity : a study of the politics of recognition and representation in Cameroon. Boston: Brill. Available at: https://www.google.co.uk/books/edition/Negotiating_an_Anglophone_Identity/0u9bWHQzDnIC?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=Justice+Frederick+Alobwede+Ebong&pg=PA105&printsec=frontcover (Accessed: 25 October 2021).

Konings, Piet and Nyamnjoh, F. B. (2003) ‘President Paul Biya and the “Anglophone Problem” in Cameroon’, in The Leadership Challenge in Africa: Cameroon Under Paul Biya, pp. 191–234.

Konings, P. and Nyamnjoh, F. B. (2019) ‘Anglophone Secessionist Movements in Cameroon’, Secessionism in African Politics. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, pp. 59–89. doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-90206-7_3.

Konings, P. and Nyamnjoh, F. B. (2021) ‘Southern Cameroons on the Road to Reunification and Federation’, in Negotiating an Anglophone Identity. Brill, pp. 22–50. doi: 10.1163/9789047402640_005.

Mbuh, M. (no date) Breach of International Obligation: A Legal Diagnistic of United Nations Resolution 1608, of April 21, 1961, Ambazonia.org. Available at: https://www.ambazonia.org/media/pdfs/Breach of International Obligations.pdf (Accessed: 25 October 2021).

Milen, M. (1999) No telephone to heaven : from apex to nadir – colonial service in Nigeria, Aden, the Cameroons and the Gold Coast , 1938-61. Meon Hill Press.

Neilson, K. (1999) ‘The Treaty of Versailles. A Reassessment after 75 Years , edited by Manfred F. Boemeke, Gerald D. Feldman, and Elisabeth Glaser’, Canadian Journal of History. University of Saskatchewan, 34(3), pp. 460–463. doi: 10.3138/cjh.34.3.460.

Nfi, J. (2011) ‘The question of insecurity in the Southern Cameroons reunification debate’, African Studies Review, pp. 53–66. Available at: https://lucas.leeds.ac.uk/article/insecurity-southern-cameroons-reunification-debate-joseph-nfi/ (Accessed: 5 March 2022).

Ngoh, V. J. (1979) ‘The Political Evolution of Cameroon, 1884-1961’, Dissertations and Theses. Portland, OR, pp. 1884–1961. doi: 10.15760/etd.2924.

Ngoh, V. J. (1999) The origin of the marginalization of former Southern Cameroons (Anglophones), 1961-1966: AN historical analysis, Source: Journal of Third World Studies , SPRING. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/45193813 (Accessed: 6 February 2022).

Njeuma, M. Z. (1995) ‘Reunification and Political Opportunism in the Making of Cameroon’s Independence’, Paideuma: Mitteilungen zur Kulturkunde, 41, pp. 27–37. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/40341690 (Accessed: 5 March 2022).

Njung, G. N. (2019) ‘The British Cameroons Mandate Regime: The Roots of the Twenty-First-Century Political Crisis in Cameroon’, American Historical Review. Oxford Academic, pp. 1715–1722. doi: 10.1093/ahr/rhz1025.

Nkongho, F. A. B. and Shepherd, B. (2017) ‘The Cameroon Anglophone Crisis: Examining Escalation and Seeking Solutions’, Chatham House. Available at: www.chathamhouse.org/research/africa. (Accessed: 25 October 2021).

Norwegian Refugee Council (2021) Violence impacts over 700,000 children due to school closures in Cameroon, NRC. Available at: https://www.nrc.no/news/2021/november/violence-impacts-700000-children-in-cameroon/ (Accessed: 15 March 2022).

Nzume, A. N. (2004) British and French Administration pf the peoples of southern Borderlands of Cameroon, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS). Available at: https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/29199/1/10731294.pdf (Accessed: 6 February 2022).

SCNC (2006) Southern Cameroons National Council: Message of Congratulations, UN archives. Available at: https://search.archives.un.org/uploads/r/united-nations-archives/8/b/b/8bb40cb9c34a8ae13b06f1aa5211f4ce8540d2f6d50693b4f331f0fda5185d0d/S-1951-0008-0004-00004.PDF (Accessed: 14 March 2022).

Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC) (no date) gobalsecurity.org. Available at: https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/scnc.htm (Accessed: 14 March 2022).

Tembon, E. W. (2016) Crisis in the Republic of the Cameroon: An Overview of the Anglophone Crisis 2016-2018, Cameroon Association for Bible Translation and Literacy.

The Star (2011) UNPO: South Cameroons: SCNC Forms Common Front in America for Celebrating Independence Date. Available at: https://unpo.org/article/12822 (Accessed: 15 March 2022).

UN (no date) Resolution 1608 (XV) of April 21, 1961 of the UN Generaal Assembly, United Nations. Available at: https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/1608(XV) (Accessed: 25 October 2021).

UN GA (11th Session:1956-1957) (1957) Attainment of self-government or independence by Trust Territories., UN Digital Library. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/207901 (Accessed: 6 February 2022).

UN General Assembly (no date a) Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly from 12 November 1956 to 8 March 1957 during its eleventh session, United Nations. Available at: https://www.un.org/disarmament/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/A-3572-resolutions.pdf (Accessed: 6 February 2022).

UN General Assembly (no date b) Resolutions adopted by the General Assemby during its 12th Session from 17 September to 14 December 1957, United Nations. Available at: https://www.un.org/disarmament/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/A-3805-Resolutions.pdf (Accessed: 6 February 2022).

Unicef UK Media Team (2019) Geneva Palais briefing note on the situation for children in the North-West and South-West regions of Cameroon, UNICEF UK. Available at: https://www.unicef.org.uk/press-releases/anglophone-crisis-in-cameroon-causes-closure-of-80-per-cent-of-schools-in-the-region-denying-more-than-600000-children-access-to-education/ (Accessed: 15 March 2022).

United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (2016) Treaty of Versailles, The Holocaust Encyclopedia. Available at: https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/treaty-of-versailles (Accessed: 6 February 2022).

US Department of State (2021) 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Cameroon. Available at: https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/cameroon/ (Accessed: 25 October 2021).

Willis, R. et al. (2019) A Report on the Cameroon Anglophone Crisis Human Rights Abuses in the Cameroon Anglophone Crisis A Submission of Evidence to UK Parliament. Available at: https://www.rightofassembly.info/assets/downloads/Cameroon_Anglophone_Crisis_Report.pdf (Accessed: 25 October 2021).

Willis, R. et al. (2020) ‘“We Remain Their Slaves”: Voices from the Cameroon Conflict’, SSRN Electronic Journal. doi: 10.2139/ssrn.3576732.

Yundze, G. (2017) Cameroon’s Anglophones call for secession or federalism, Anadolu Agency. Available at: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/analysis-cameroon-s-anglophones-call-for-secession-or-federalism/785179 (Accessed: 4 February 2022).